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Abstract 
High pressure enriched oxygen is used in a wide number of areas, including aircraft, medical breathing 
apparatus, and a number of industrial processes including combustion. Unwanted ignition in such 
systems can cause significant damage to property and danger to life.  It is important to gain as much 
information, and record relevant data for every oxygen incident, enabling both immediate analysis, 
and post-event evaluations (especially where circumstances are repeated). The lack of clear concise 
guidance can result in data loss. This work successfully develops investigation ‘road maps’ as guidance 
documents for investigators to use, even under difficult & time pressured conditions. The work 
demonstrates their usefulness and importance for information collection and the down-selection’ or 
elimination of possible ignition causes through their use with a ‘real world’ case study. The benefit of 
this work will be to enable faster and more effective investigation of oxygen incidents, ensuring key 
details are recorded (benefitting post-accident academic data & meta-study analysis). The roadmaps 
can also benefit designers of oxygen systems allowing them to test their designs and operating 
procedures against specific ignition scenarios. 
Keywords 
Oxygen systems; Health & Safety; Incident investigation; Road maps; Fires; explosions; Exothermic 
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1. Introduction 
Oxygen is of course vital to sustain life and for this reason oxygen life support systems or breathing 
apparatuses are used in a wide number of areas, including civil and military aircraft, medical breathing 
apparatus and hyperbaric chambers, and diving and mountaineering systems.   Oxygen is also used 
industrially to support combustion.  Combustion is the rapid runaway oxidation of a fuel, generally 
following a specific energy input to a fuel/oxidiser mixture.  In the case of combustion, the oxidation 
reaction rate passes a critical point, resulting in energy release and free radical formation that is great 
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enough to bring about further oxidation.  Thus a self-perpetuating reaction occurs, while there is both 
oxygen and fuel to sustain it.   
As oxygen is used so extensively, it is often necessary to store and use it at pressures and 
concentrations well above that of atmospheric.  Under these conditions, oxidation reactions occur 
more readily, and at a faster rate.  Some adverse circumstances can result in ignition incidents that 
can, in turn, lead to catastrophic system failure, destruction of property and endangerment of life. 
A large number of oxygen incidents have been described in the literature, showing both the 
seriousness and scale of this problem.  Between 1982 and 1985, Dicker and Wharton (1988) reported 
28 high pressure oxygen incidents, while Fowler and Baxter (2000) detailed several incidents in the UK 
involving pressurized oxygen in the period 1996 – 1998.  Gregson (2008) (of the UK HSE) recorded 158 
reported oxygen incidents between 1996 and 2002, including 59 minor injuries, 25 major injuries and 
5 fatalities. The NASA Oxygen-Enriched Fire Incidents reporting site (2013) records 119 documents for 
the period 1984 and 2009.  A few of these relate to proposed possible incidents, but the majority 
detail actual oxygen incidents, with a number containing details of more than 1 event. These primarily 
occurred in the USA armed forces, hospitals or similar commercial establishments. The site also lists 30 
further incidents in Boeing establishments prior to 1992.  This is a voluntary recording system and is 
not therefore indicative of the total number of incidents in the USA, but does show there is in 
continuing problem. Ahrens (2008) detailed a series of oxygen incidents between 2002 and 2005. 
These incidents all occurred in the USA, and had been attended and recorder by the US Fire Service 
attended.  He reported an average of 182 fire incidents per year where medical oxygen had been the 
cause of the fire, resulting in an average of 46 deaths per year.  Ahrens also reported there were an 
average of 1190 thermal burns per year for the period between 2003 and 2006 involving oxygen use, 
primarily in the home.  The NFPA (2014) medical oxygen incident document recoded a selected 40 
serious incidents, primarily in the home, involving significant death, injury or financial damage, where 
medical oxygen was involved.  This included 2 fatal fires from 2014. The EIGA Safety Advisory Group 
(2009), the industry group on European compressed gas safety, listed examples of oxygen incidents 
stating there have been many more similar incidents.   
 After an incident has occurred a there is clearly a need to investigate what happened, to learn what 
went wrong and inform future guidance and safety research. In the case of oxygen systems There are a 
number of interested parties concerned with oxygen incidents. The process can be confined to one 
organisation, for example an insurance company consultant, or collaborative.  The more serious the 
incident, the more institutions may have to be involved e.g. an injury or death will result in the 
involvement of police and, in the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) or in the USA the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) or one of the organisations they oversee. 
In the absence of specific guidance such parties are likely to apply their own procedures for the 
investigation of such incidents, leading to significant variations with what is recorded and how. Of the 
incidents listed on the NASA Oxygen-Enriched Fire Incidents reporting site (2013) 12% mention 
incorrect material use as the cause, 5% are attributed to contamination (usually of oil), 4% to adiabatic 
compression/pressure shock and 3% to particle ignition. 54% do not state a cause, or identify, multiple 
possible ignition sources due to burn damage and insufficient evidence.  Gregson (2008) attributes 
incidents to and list of four common causes (contamination, fast opening of valves, oxygen enrichment 
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from leaks, incompatible materials).  Dicker & Wharton (1998) report 28 incidents, not by cause, but 
by system location with 39% occurring in pressure regulators, 21% during cylinder filling operations, 
18% in pipelines/ manifold and the rest in other equipment such as cylinder valves.  Indeed past 
incident investigation reports carried out by qualified investigators (Benson 2015) show a dramatic 
lack of standardisation or thoroughness in the information collected.   This has resulted in limited and 
inadequate information to academically assess/ review incidents or conduct further analysis in relation 
to specific pathways to ignition.  
This is in stark comparison to other areas of incident investigation such as house appliance fires where 
the collection of detailed data has led to databases for academics & fire professionals to draw on and 
identify un-safe activities and products (Campbell 2017, Holborn et al 2003) and encourage recalls. 
There are currently standards & guidance that can be used to identify hazards in an oxygen system, or 
the likelihood of material ignition (BCGA, CGA, EIGA, HSE indg459, BS 5N100-5, ASTM standards G63, 
G88, and G124) but they exist in different jurisdictions, ‘sit’ in different industries, and serve different 
purposes.  Only one standard, ASTM G145-08 (2016), specifically advises on oxygen incident 
investigation but while this also advises on likely hazards, and contributory factors, it does not offer a 
detailed framework or process guidance that any investigator, especially those relatively unfamiliar 
with high-pressure enriched oxygen systems, might use.  This has contributed to the lack of 
consistency of approach, and a dramatic shortage of data to enable academics and engineers to 
identify safety problems (Benson 2015). Therefore a standardised methodology for narrowing the field 
of, or down selecting, likely ignition sources, would be useful. 
The principles of accident investigation, in general, are well documented. Although investigation of the 
most serious events will have substantial resources available to it, the philosophy behind having a 
safety culture, regulations and regulatory organisations is to identify problems before they happen, or 
before they cause serious harm (HSE “Investigating accidents and incidents” guide 2004). In 
investigating an oxygen incident, it is essential to ensure as much key information as possible can be 
gleaned from the debris to help identify inappropriate materials, aid in the design of oxygen system 
components, and most importantly, to prevent similar incidents occurring in the future. It is also 
essential to record the scientific information for even minor incidents/near misses, since this could 
give insight into potential root causes of problems in a major incident (of similar root cause) where 
escalation might make identification of the ignition source difficult or impossible.  
Frameworks such as a checklist or flow diagram can aid in making sure key information is identified, 
and recorded, benefiting the wider investigation process and industry safety information (Mansi 2012). 
They can also enable the fast and accurate causes of incidents, as well as ensure that useful data was 
collected for post incident investigation and academic scrutiny. Such a system could readily be applied 
to the investigation of incidents involving oxygen systems, providing a means of combining the known 
data on oxygen systems fires/hazards with the principles of incident investigation. 
This work details the development and application of incident investigation roadmaps for oxygen 
systems. These will enable faster and more effective investigation of oxygen incidents, while ensuring 
key details are recorded and thus benefit post-accident academic analysis. The roadmaps can also 
4 
 
benefit designers of oxygen systems allowing them to test their designs and operating procedures 
against specific ignition scenarios. 
2. Theoretical oxygen incident investigation 
2.1. Oxygen incident causes 
Although the root cause of an incident may be any number of different things including a range of 
management failures involved in equipment checks and maintenance, staff training etc. the actual 
sources of ignition for the vast majority of incidents in high pressure enriched oxygen systems are 
limited to a few events (BS 5N 100-5 2006, ASTM G88 -13). These are identified as: 
 Pressure shock and rapid adiabatic compression (accumulated oil/ grease often facilitates 
this method of ignition). 
 Impact by contaminant particles 
 Mechanical impact  
 Friction in valves 
 Cavity resonance 
 Electric arcing (e.g. short circuit arcing through sheath) 
Electrostatic ignition is also identified in G88 -13 as a hazard.  Although Fresh Metal Exposure (FME) is 
another listed cause in that standard, particularly for materials like aluminium with a high combustion 
enthalpy, the mechanism will likely be through some form of impact or rubbing and thus is included 
under those umbrella terms in this work.  ASTM G128 / G128M - 15, a guide to controlling hazards and 
risks in oxygen systems, deals only directly with the first four sources listed for ignition prevention, 
stating these are the most common.   
The accumulation of dust in a system, the contamination by grease not suitable for high pressure 
oxygen service, poor design or inappropriate component material selection resulting in shearing and 
particle generation can all contribute to the ignition. For example, some dusts and liquids, particularly 
organic materials, can self-heat (HSE Offshore Information Sheet No. 11/2008). In practice, there may 
be multiple failures/causes, mechanisms possibly acting in combination (Yuen et al 1988).    
Kindling chain ignition is also a commonly listed cause, but is never the primary cause, with the initial 
ignition caused by the combustion of other constituent materials or contaminants resulting in a chain of 
ignitions.  An ignition mechanism called “flow friction” was proposed by Beeson et al (2007) (and is 
mentioned in G88-13) describing it as being caused as a gas flow travels across a polymer, causing 
erosion and the generation of heat.  It is reported by Gallus and Stoltzfus (2006) that a number of fires 
at NASA have been attributed to this, however Stoltzfus et al (2012) report that it had not been possible 
to replicate this supposed ignition source, and that other explanations, such as ignition or self-heating 
of foreign contamination, are more probable.  As this has not been shown to be a credible source of 
ignition this will not be discussed further in this work.   
BS EN 1127 (2011) makes reference to a series of possible ignition sources in flammable atmospheres.  
Although oxygen is not inherently flammable, as it supports combustion, these sources should be 
referred to.  For example, it is clear that the presence of any external heat source, or possibility of a 
lightning strike, should always be investigated.  Some of the sources of ignition named in BS EN 1127 
are wholly dependent on the presence of specific types of apparatus, e.g. sources of electromagnetic 
waves and ionising radiation, and ultrasonic apparatus. They are rare in terms of direct oxygen system 
ignition and are therefore more likely to be the cause of a kindling chain ignition.  While these may be 
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possible, and the presence of such apparatus should be explored, the following sections in this work 
will deal with primarily with the causes that cover the vast majority of incidents, as described in BS 5N 
100-5 2006, and ASTM G88-13.   
2.2. Potential methodologies - Solutions from Industry 
A number of industries, including chemical and aviation, have developed a variety of tools to check the 
systems they use.  The use of a structure, such as road maps or checklists can significantly improve 
task success.  They do this by reducing the opportunity for human error (Bates et al 2003).  
The simplest of these structured approaches is the checklist.  A checklist is a formal list used to 
identify, schedule, compare or verify a group of elements (Federal Aviation Administration 2016) and 
although it can be as simple as a shopping list, it was first introduced as a safety tool by Boeing in 1935 
(Gawande 2009).  More recently they have been introduced to the medical industry, for example the 
WHO surgical safety checklist (Anderson et al 2015).  These have resulted in immediate industry 
improvement and in a significant drop in mortality (Van Klei et al 2012, Anderson et al 2015).   
Investigation flow charts and road maps are another structured process providing a defined path to 
achieve a prescribed goal, but can incorporate multiple courses enabling application to more complex 
tasks than purely linear processes (ISO 5807 1985).  Flow or process charts were first used by Gilbreth 
and Gilbreth (1921), and have been used for a number of years to detail strategies, processes or paths 
in technical areas.  They have been found extremely useful areas where there may be possible 
hazardous outcomes, such as nuclear safety engineering (Kempsell et al 2001).   
In respect to oxygen Forsyth et al 2003 offers guidance in relation to identifying possible system 
hazards with a standard forensic system to component to material process, but the work also includes 
a series of short checklists, ranking importance of hazards, but again this is with a design mind-set and 
often concentrates on specific components.   
For investigation purposes Stephenson (2003) reports road maps have also been employed to combine 
complex computer technology with traditional investigative methods to investigate digital incidents/ 
crimes.  The NFPA provide numerous flow diagrams in the NFPA 921 (2014) for the purposes of fire 
investigation in a range of circumstances, and Mansi (2012) has proposed their use to guide general 
fire investigators at scenes.   
Mansi (2012) produced over 200 Fire Investigation Road Maps (FIRMs) to enable a structured way to 
assess each scene, and to make sure that no possible fire cause could be missed.  They take the form 
of flow diagrams containing boxes that represent actions, decisions to be made, and conclusions that 
can be drawn.  While excellent for training purposes it seems unrealistic that every fire investigator 
attending a scene very soon after the fire, generally with extremely little information on the nature of 
the fire, would be carrying a 150 page volume (although the use of technology may in future e.g. an 
app on a tablet computer makes this more feasible).  However, in insurance or Health & Safety 
Executive investigations it is far more likely that more specific information on the fire/ explosion would 
have been given, e.g. an oxygen cylinder has exploded during charging.  Under these circumstances 
having a few road maps to analyse the likelihood of each possible ignition source is a far more realistic 
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strategy.  They provide a series of logical steps, each assessing the factors that might contribute to 
ignition.  
These are ideal for ignition assessments of oxygen incidents to quickly focus investigation to relevant 
areas, even where a relative in-expert may be conducting it, due to their easy interpretation and multi-
path capability, reducing time and resource use.  This supported by Kempsell et al (2001) who also list 
advantages as opportunity for standardisation, for auditing (using numbered boxes), and the possibility 
to expand or make them part of a wider network or system.  While a useful tool, it is advised that they 
are used as a first stage in, and part of, an overall event or fault analysis to identify the root cause(s) of 
any incident (Benner 1985). 
3. Development of road maps for the investigation of oxygen incidents 
Based on the extensive literature on the hazards within oxygen systems relating to the causes of fires 
or explosions in high pressure enriched oxygen it is possible to construct a straightforward series of 
processes for the investigator of oxygen incidents in order to identify the likely cause of ignition.  
Following similar processes to those of Weiser et al (2010) first the critical process content has been 
defined for each ignition cause, i.e. what is required to occur for each separate ignition source to be 
possible within a high pressure enriched oxygen system, and then diagrammatic formats are compared 
to assess their usefulness for different scenarios.  The systems has then be checked against a real life 
incident report to check their suitability.  Following the example of Mansi (2012) the factors that lead 
to the ignition are identified using the traditional flow chart gate designation of AND and OR.  Factors 
that must occur to bring about an ignition will come under the AND designation, while where a 
number of possible factors could bring about the same outcome, contributing towards the ignition, 
the designation of OR has been applied (See Figures 1 to 7).  These are then used in the final flow 
charts produced in figures 9 to 15.  
3.1. Identification of critical content for ignition causes in oxygen systems 
3.1.1. Ignition by pressure shock and adiabatic compression 
When high-pressure valves are opened quickly gas entering the system rapidly can result in heating of 
materials by two modes.  Firstly where high pressure fast flowing gas enters closed-ended 
components, gas within the component will be adiabatically compressed.  Due to the rapid 
compression the gas heats up, and this hot gas can in turn heat surrounding component materials.  
Secondly this rapid gas flow can result in a supersonic shock wave, referred to as pneumatic shock, as 
successive compression waves coalesce, and this shock wave further heats materials in the system. In 
reality it is difficult to determine which of these modes of heating might have occurred, as they 
generally happen together (Newton and Steinberg 2009).   
Yuen et al (1988) stated that at pressures of 40MPa (approximately 6000psi), temperatures produced 
by adiabatic compression were up to 1773K (1500°C). The theoretical maximum temperature of rapid 
pressurisation of a gas can be calculated using: 
𝑇𝑓
𝑇𝑖
= (
𝑃𝑓
𝑃𝑖
)
(𝑘−1)
𝑘
 
Eqn. 1.1 
where 
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Tf  = Final temperature 
Ti = Initial temperature 
Pf = Final pressure 
Pi = Initial pressure 
k = Ratio of specific heats (cp/cv) ≈ 1.4 for oxygen 
where 
cp  =  Specific heat at a known constant pressure 
cv  = Specific heat at a known constant volume 
This effect has been known to ignite any vapour from accumulated grease and oils in oxygen systems, 
which then provides the energy for further ignition of the system components.  Testing has shown that 
this mechanism can result in ignition of polymers, and lighter metals/ alloys.  The presence of sintered 
filters can provide an extra hazard because they may contain trapped contaminants prone to ignition, 
and can be more prone to ignition than bulk materials (Benson 2015, Schadler and Stoltzfus 1993).  
Newton et al (2000) reported a case of an aluminium medical regulators igniting due to this cause.  In 
this case an oxygen cylinder valve was opened allowing pressurised oxygen into the regulator, which 
had the flow control turned to the off position.  According to Yuen et al (1988) the chances of adiabatic 
compression can be decreased by the introduction of slow opening valves and heat sinks.  These 
engineering solutions may however result in an increase in cost that many end users might be resistant 
to accommodating.  These points have been incorporated into Figure 1, showing the contributory factors 
which must be combined (AND gate designation) for ignition to occur, and identifying where a range of 
factors might lead to the same outcome (OR gate designation).   
Figure 1. Factors leading to ignition from pressure shock and adiabatic compression 
AND 
High Pressure 
Enriched O2 
Dead end tube 
(+ damage) 
High fluid velocity 
(driven by pressure 
differential) 
OR 
   Contamination Non-metals (low 
enough SIT) 
Light metals in 
dead end section 
Sintered/ thin 
bulk metals near 
dead end 
3.1.2. Ignition from impact by contaminant particles 
In flowing oxygen any particles, which enter or break off from within the system, can reach sonic 
velocities.  The impact of these particles is capable of igniting both bulk metals and non-metals.  The 
mechanism of ignition varies.  Generally it is the particles that ignite on impact and the energy produced 
by this ignites further materials.  Alternatively if the material being impacted upon is particularly 
flammable (e.g. polymers, aluminium) it may ignite before the particle. This secondary ignition, capable 
of igniting heavier bulk metals such as steel (Williams et al 1988), and is a form of ‘promoted ignition 
combustion (Stoltzfus et al 1988).  Yuen et al 1988 found that bends and valves were likely to be the 
most critical ignition sites.  Newton et al (2000) also reported particle impact had been responsible for 
igniting a number of aluminium bodied regulators, often indicated by contaminants in the system, or in 
attached cylinders.  These points have been incorporated into Figure 2.   
Figure 2. Factors leading to ignition from particle impact 
AND 
High Pressure 
Enriched O2 
High fluid 
velocity 
Particle 
contamination 
impingement 
site 
 
3.1.3. Ignition by mechanical impact 
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Energy is transferred from kinetic energy, by the impact of an object with a large mass.   A material’s 
impact ignition sensitivity can be tested by a number of different methods (Stoltzfus et al 1988).  
Mechanical impact tests involve dropping a known mass on to a fixed sample from a particular height 
while particle impact tests involve shooting a particle (either of aluminium or iron) of known size, at a 
known velocity, on to a material’s surface. In both of these tests the atmospheric pressure may be varied 
to find the maximum working pressure/ concentration for the material.  Mechanical impact energy is 
difficult to determine as it is related to the masses of the materials, their system position and physical 
parameters such as stress, and deformation and is affected significantly by the direction of impact 
(Goldsmith 2011).  A crude maximum possible impact energy, E, can be calculated where a small mass 
hits a far larger mass using:  
E = ½ mv2 
where m is the mass and v the velocity, however in the case of particle impact there is also the possibility 
that the particle will ignite, adding to the energy available to trigger oxidation of the bulk material. 
Testing has succeeded in igniting only polymers and the very light metals and alloys (e.g. aluminium-
bronze, titanium) and according to McColskey et al (1991) this type of test has not ignited the majority 
of bulk metals such as Stainless Steels, or brasses. These points have been incorporated into Figure 3. 
Figure 3. Factors leading to ignition from mechanical impact 
AND 
High 
Pressure 
Enriched O2 
OR OR 
 
2(+) fast 
striking bodies 
2(+) heavy 
striking bodies 
Continual 
repeated 
striking bodies 
Contamination 
Non-metals 
(low enough 
SIT) 
Light metals in 
dead end 
section 
3.1.4. Ignition from frictional heating 
Continuous rubbing, for example, within a valve can cause a build-up of heat energy.  The level of heat 
produced depends on the surface smoothness, the contact area, and the frictional coefficient of the 
materials involved.  Tests for frictional heating take various forms however, they generally comprise of 
one moving and one stationary part, with materials in each position varied.  The ignition probability is 
tested varying 2 parameters (aside from materials); Pressure; and linear surface velocity.  In the case of 
metals the friction can also reveal clean metal that is not protected by an oxide layer.  The rapid oxidation 
of this new metal can provide the energy for a runaway combustion reaction.  Examples of this are a 
centrifugal compressor rotor rubbing against its casing, or friction in aluminium valves (ASTM G94-05 
2014).  These points have been incorporated into Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Factors leading to ignition from frictional heating 
AND 
High 
Pressure 
Enriched O2 
High velocity/ heavy 
load twisting parts 
with surface contact OR 
  
Evidence of 
contamination 
Non-metals (with a 
low enough SIT) Light metals 
3.1.5. Ignition by cavity resonance 
The ISO standard 14624-2 (2003) states that acoustic oscillations inside resonant cavities can cause a 
rapid rise in temperature.  If particles are present in the chamber, or if gas velocities are high, this 
resonance can produce much higher temperatures.  This type of ignition has been shown to be 
particularly ubiquitous where gas flows into a tee, from a throttling device such as a valve (Rosales et al 
STP 1479 2006).  Gas flowing into a tee and out of a branch port can form a resonant chamber at the 
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remaining closed port.  This has been shown to provide enough energy to ignite polymers, aluminium 
and stainless steels in testing.  The presence of contamination in the system makes this source of ignition 
particularly likely as this may be ignited if lying in the resonant heating zone.  These points have been 
incorporated into Figure 5. 
Figure 5. Factors leading to ignition from cavity resonance 
AND 
High Pressure 
Enriched O2 
Dead end 
tube  
In-line throttling 
device (e.g valve) 
Evidence of 
contamination 
3.1.6. Ignition by electric arcing and sparking  
Arcing and sparking are similar but not the same.  Arcing is the electrical breakdown of a gas causing 
an on-going plasma stream, while sparking is a momentary electrostatic discharge (via a plasma 
stream) from one charged surface to an earthed surface.  However they are grouped together in this 
case because they can both result in very high temperature.  There are a range of circumstances that 
can result in electrical ignition of flammable material (BS EN 1127), but generally arcs/sparks form on 
the opening/closing of circuits (by design or loose connections) or by stray currents.  The nature of 
oxygen system engineering and materials mean that ignition from external arcs/sparks is possible in 
the presence of high powered systems, ungrounded power supplies, and short-circuits.  All types of 
material, bar only the heavier bulk metal groups, have been shown to ignite by this means in 
laboratory testing (Beeson et al 2007b).  These points have been incorporated into Figure 6. 
Figure 6. Factors leading to ignition from electric arcing & sparking 
AND 
High Pressure 
Enriched O2 OR OR 
 
Ungrounded 
power 
supply 
High power 
systems next to 
O2 system 
Short-circuited 
power supply 
Evidence of 
contamination 
Non-metals 
(low enough 
SIT) Light metals 
Sintered/ thin 
bulk metals  
3.1.7. Static electricity 
According to BS EN 1127 the discharge of charged, insulated conductive parts can easily lead to 
incendiary sparks.  ASTM G88-13 offers the example of an electrically isolated ball valve.  Equally non-
conducting materials, including most plastics, can develop a potential and discharge.  Fast flowing gas 
with dust contamination, or dry oxygen through hoses, (Rosales et al –STP 1479) can cause a potential 
to develop on exposed non-conducting surfaces, and 2 non-conductive surfaces can accumulate 
charge when they rub together.    British standard document PD CLC/TR 60079-32-1:2015, which 
appears to equate oxygen-enriched atmospheres with the more dangerous classifications of 
flammable atmospheres, recommends dissipative materials, metals bonded to earth, and limiting area 
of polymer surface, although there is not specific reference to high pressure oxygen in this standard.  
The risk is increased in dry environments, such as those in oxygen systems.  These points have been 
incorporated into Figure 7. 
Figure 7. Factors leading to ignition from static electricity 
AND 
HP/E O2 
Non-conducting/ electrically 
isolated surface(s) 
OR 
  
Charge developed by dust 
contamination in oxygen flow 
Charge from rubbing 
together of 2 surfaces  
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3.2. Investigation tool development 
Using the information defined in section 2.1 there are a number of options for tool development to 
enable the correct and timely collection and recording of information relating to oxygen system ignition; 
A checklist, a single roadmap (linking all factors to the ignition causes), or specific roadmaps for each 
cause.  Each had advantages in terms of usefulness of information collected and time saving. 
Under time pressured circumstances, where only the minimum resources can be spared, a checklist of 
crucial information might be a good option.  The following list below shows the factors identified as 
contributing/ causing ignition in oxygen systems: 
System design 
 High fluid velocity possible? 
 Dead end tube? 
 Correct harmonic conditions for resonance 
 Ungrounded power supply 
 High power systems next to O2 system 
 2 or more fast striking bodies 
 High velocity/ heavy load twisting parts 
 Electrically isolated components 
 Exposure of non-conducting/ electrically isolated surface to oxygen flow 
 2 rubbing non-conducting/ electrically isolated surface 
System condition 
 Evidence of contamination? 
 Damage near dead end tube? 
 Short-circuited power supply 
System materials 
 Non-metals (low enough SIT for ignition based on material testing) 
 Light metals 
 Light metals in dead end section? 
 Sintered/ thin bulk metals near dead end? 
 Non-conducting material 
 
However, this checklist method is extremely limiting and offers no connection to the causes.  While 
time may be limited in an investigation setting, while tick box process might be useful to check 
information has not been missed, it would therefore be too constrictive for an investigator to evaluate 
the failed oxygen system, or to explore the alternative and unusual causes listed in BS 1127 if used 
alone.    
A single road map form, as shown in Figure 8, is capable of showing what needs to be examined and 
collected including the context of the possible ignition mechanisms.  This also enables an investigator 
to see if there were a series of design errors with the system in one diagram.   However, as with the 
checklist, this method has limitations as it fails to allow the investigator to develop a wider view on the 
system ignition event, particularly when there maybe multiple influencing factors, or something 
unexpected.  
Figure 8. A combination roadmap showing the factors leading to ignition in high pressure enriched oxygen 
systems 
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Causes Particle ignition Pressure shock Cavity 
resonance 
Electric 
arc/spark 
Mechanical 
impact 
Frictional 
heating 
Electrostatic 
ignition 
Environment High pressure or enriched oxygen environment? 
System design High fluid velocity possible?      
 Dead end tube?     
  Correct 
harmonic 
conditions 
    
   Ungrounded 
power supply    
   High power 
systems next to 
O2 system 
   
    2 or more fast 
striking bodies   
     High velocity/ 
heavy load 
twisting parts 
 
      Electrically 
isolated 
components 
      Exposure of 
non-
conducting/ 
electrically 
isolated surface 
to oxygen flow 
      2 rubbing non-
conducting/ 
electrically 
isolated surface 
System 
condition 
Evidence of contamination? 
 Damage near 
dead end tube?      
   Short-circuited 
power supply    
System 
materials  
Non-metals  Non-metals  
  Light metals  Light metals  
  Light metals in 
dead end 
section? 
     
  Sintered/ thin 
bulk metals 
near dead end? 
     
       Non-conducting 
material 
        
 
Finally Individual cause road maps are shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10 (further examples can be seen 
in Benson 2015).  Here the factors contributing to ignition in oxygen systems are limited to the ignition 
mechanism type.  The flow diagram road map form allows each ignition source to be evaluated in turn, 
listing the key points that need to be considered and recorded to justify any decision.  The advantage 
of having a wider diagram is that it is also possible to put references and reasons for the inclusion of 
that factor directly on to the diagram.  These allow a narrative for ignition causes, but do not 
encourage a purely tick box mentality to investigation.  Rather aiding the investigator to identify the 
factors that contribute to the most common causes.  These diagrams have an additional strength in 
that they might also be used as guidance to avoid dangerous factors, or combination thereof, when 
designing, constructing or sourcing components for oxygen systems.   I would also be possible to 
reference particular materials testing methods or standards that an investigator could use to e.g. 
identify materials. 
  
1
2
 
 
Figure 9. Road map to assess the likelihood of pressure shock as a possible ignition source 
Pressure 
Shock
High pressure 
enriched Oxygen?
YES
NO
Is there a dead-
end section showing 
damage?
YES
Is high fluid 
velocity possible?
YES
e.g. a fast running systems or 
possibility of fast-opening valve
NO NO
Evidence of 
contamination?
Possibly ignition 
source
Any non-metals 
with AIT low enough to 
reach?
NO
Any sintered/  thin bulk 
metal components 
near dead-end section?
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
Unlikely to be 
ignition source
Any light metals 
used to make dead-end 
section?
NO
YES
Either by external particles, grease, or 
pieces of sheared/  damaged 
components
E.g. aluminium, titanium
The EIGA safety info 15/08/E 
document provides specialist 
instructions for 23.5% oxygen 
by volume and a pressure 
above 3 MPa
  
1
3
 
 
Figure 10. Road map to assess the likelihood of particle impact as a possible ignition source 
Particle 
impact
NO
YES
Evidence of particle 
contamination?
Possibly ignition 
source
Any possible 
impingement sites 
displaying fire damage?
NO
YES
Unlikely to be 
ignition source
Either by external particles or pieces 
of sheared/  damaged components
High pressure enriched 
Oxygen?
Is high fluid 
velocity possible?
e.g. a fast running systems or 
possibility of fast-opening valve
YES
NO
YES
NO
The EIGA safety info 15/08/E 
document provides specialist 
instructions for 23.5% oxygen 
by volume and a pressure 
above 3 MPa
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4. Application of road maps to oxygen incidents 
The road maps developed can be applied to ‘real life’ incidents, i.e. actual configurations of materials 
in oxygen systems that have ignited in the past, to enable identification of the likely causes of ignition 
and collection of information.    
Although some assumptions might still be necessary in the absence of all required information, these 
processes should aid in turning the incident investigation into one based more in scientific reasoning, 
and to make certain that relevant information is collected should even greater depth investigation be 
required at a later date.  It should also provide greater insight into possible incidents of the future, the 
importance of material selection, and why knowledge of the physical and thermal properties of the 
materials involved is also so important.  This would then provide a greater database for prediction & 
prevention of incidents, and possibly insights into existing or new ignition phenomena.   
If this greater database existed it would be possible to perform a quantitative statistical analysis as part 
of this process. Information on material & component failure (such as those used in FMECA [Reliability 
analysis centre 1993]) as well as lengths of service for the system components, could be incorporated 
into this process.  With the relevant data (following a significant number of flammability tests or 
incidents) it would also be possible to apply probability data to the ignition of materials.  It might then 
be possible to perform an analysis, such as a Bayesian analysis, to determine any ignition hazard 
issues.  Due to the difficulty in testing materials in pure oxygen (limited number of apparatus globally, 
danger, expense) test data are not currently available in the volume that would enable this type of 
analysis.  Although not their primary role, Figures 9 and 10 might also be used to advise active system 
designers and installers in industrial plants to check if there is any danger of ignition in their oxygen 
systems, by following the flow diagrams for the systems they are making.   They can be used in a 
standardised way, and using numbered boxes to allow an audit trail for decisions making.  They can 
also be used as the basis of development for more complex/ expert systems and knowledge banks on 
oxygen hazards. 
The following section contains information on an incident obtained from an in-depth incident 
component examination report carried out by the Health and Safety Laboratory (Geary 2007a).  This 
incident report is not indicative of general incident issues, but a report of greater depth by HSL.  The 
in-depth investigation was requested by the HSE as this was the fourth in a series of similar incidents 
to occur.  
4.1. Incident and system  
In February 2007 a PTFE lined oxygen supply hose attached to a cylinder ignited and failed during 
recharging at Mansfield Mines Rescue Service.  There was extensive damage to the hose, as well as 
evidence of heat damage and fusion to the internal components of an attached bleed valve.         
The system was for recharging oxygen cylinders at high pressure.  The system is capable of recharging 
using a 2000 psi loop (13.8 MPa) and a 3000 psi loop (20.7 MPa).  The layout of the full system is 
shown in Figure 11.  Several cylinders needed recharging.  Following the successful filling of three 
cylinders, the process of filling a fourth cylinder was begun.  Following the opening of the output stop 
valve, but prior to the opening of the recharge cylinder valve the operator noticed that the flexible 
 15 
hose between the two was glowing.  This was very quickly followed by the hose rupturing.  The oxygen 
supply was isolated, and the fire extinguished.  
The standard system filling procedure was identified by Geary (2006) as good practice due to the 
gradual rise in pressure in the system, however, investigators ascertained that in reality a full three-
stage pressurisation process (with the full 3000 psi or 20.7 MPa booster pressure being applied after 
the cylinder pressures) was only followed by operators for the first cylinder being filled. For 
subsequent cylinders the hose and attached components would go from ambient pressure (having 
been bled) to the full booster pressure of 20.7 MPa.    
Figure 11.  System schematic from HSL report Geary (2007a) showing the components and oxygen flow 
during recharging of a cylinder which resulted in catastrophic failure  
 
 
 
4.2. System components  
All of the system components were examined by investigators, however, most did not display anything 
unusual or any indications they may have contributed to the incident, other than by providing the high 
pressure oxygen.  Based on damage and soot deposition the components of interest were between 
the system output valve and the cylinder valve, focused in 2 components; the oxygen supply hose, and 
the bleed valve.   
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The metallic ends of the flexible PTFE lined hose burst in the incident, each with some of the hose still 
attached (180mm and 10mm respectively).  The hose ends were made of leaded 60/40 brass, while 
the outer braid sheathing (external diameter, 11 mm) and ferrules connecting the hose to the end 
piece were made from 314 stainless steel.  The inner lining of the hose was made of PTFE (external 
diameter, 8.42-8.51 mm, thickness, 0.957-0.999 mm).  At the system pressure of 20.7 MPa the SIT of 
PTFE has been calculated to be approximately 760 K (Benson et al 2016).  The stainless steel and brass 
materials have melting points (which can be used as probable SIT values re. Abbud-Madrid et al 1993) 
of 1783K and 1173K respectively and extinguishing pressures (EPs) of 6.9 and 68.9MPa respectively 
(NASA NSS 1740.15 1996).  The original hose was approximately 630mm including the fittings.   
The hose showed evidence of 2 failure events.  Firstly the hose tube liner and braiding had split and 
broken off approximately 10 mm from the hose connector piece at the bleed valve end.  The lack of 
combustion evidence suggests this was an overpressure issue.  Further along the tube there were a 
number of areas that showed evidence of melting and incomplete combustion of the stainless steel 
braiding.  A significant amount of the PTFE had burned away.  Where the tube liner was still in place, 
the liner showed evidence of internal thinning to an average thickness of 0.43 mm.   
A diagram of the oxygen supply hose bleed valve unit, including the complex internal parts, can be 
seen in Figure 12.  There is a central bore running through the main valve body, in which there is a 
small ball bearing (which acts a check valve, preventing gas from the cylinder moving past this point), a 
sintered filter to prevent particles from travelling into the system, and a retaining screw with a hollow 
bore through the centre.   The complexity of the valve and series of small parts shown in in Figure 12 
demonstrate the difficult nature of incidents involving components that contain multiple small sub-
components.  
Figure 12. Aluminium bronze bleed valve produced using detail from Geary (2006), Geary (2007a), & Geary 
(2007b) 
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The main valve body is made of aluminium bronze.  Although the likely ignition temperature of the 
bulk material is over 2000K, over the melting temperature of Aluminium Oxide (Abbud-Madrid et al 
1993), this material is not regarded as being suitable for high pressure enriched oxygen service as 
ignition occurs at pressures as low as 3.5 MPa (BS 5N 100-5).  The internal component parts in the 
direct gas stream are made of bronze (most likely tin bronze from debris analysis). Tin Bronze has a 
melting temperature (lower limit) of approximately 1127 K (Matweb.com 2017) and an extinguishing 
pressure of at least 68.9 MPa (NASA NSS 1740.15. (1996)), although small components have a higher 
surface area to mass ratio making the materials more prone to ignition (Schadler and Stoltzfus 1993).  
There is also a bore at right angles with the main central bore.  This contains a metal shaft which can 
be screwed in and out using the wheel at the top.  At the base of the shaft is another ball bearing.  This 
section of the component acts as the bleed valve for the charging hose.      
The damage in the bleed valve was contained in the main central bore.  The retaining screw was 
undamaged however the sintered filter had broken into pieces and showed signs of oxidation.  Some 
of the check valve ball bearing was left behind, although the mass of debris has not been defined.  The 
shaft and ball bearing in the bleed valve mechanism had not been damaged, but were covered in soot.  
Table 1 The component parts of a bleed valve involved in a catastrophic failure event in 2007  
Component part Dimensions Approximate 
Mass g 
Approx. SIT K 
Valve body (Al Bronze)  5.7mm long 
(4.3mm body) 
200-250 2072 
Retaining screw  (314 SS)  Approx. 7mm diameter 
& 5mm length 
5 1783 
Sintered filter (Tin bronze) Approx. 4.4 mm 1 1127  
powder =655 
Check valve ball bearing (Tin bronze) 3.2 mm diameter 1 1127 
Bleed valve shaft (314 SS) Approx. 5mm diameter 4 1783 
Bleed valve ball bearing (Tin bronze) 3.2 mm 1 1127 
SS = Stainless Steel 
4.3. Ignition mode analysis using Road map process   
The physical evidence has been compared to the processes outlined in investigation road maps (see 
Figure 9 and Figure 10, and Benson 2015 for examples), and these have been used to assess the 
likelihood of ignition modes.   
Briefly, the lack of electrical, fast moving parts or rubbing parts next to the areas of damage imply 
static, electrical, mechanical impact and frictional heating can be dismissed as probable cause of 
ignition.  For cavity resonance to occur the main requirement is an area of stagnation (such as a dead 
ended off shoot from the system) where contaminants might accumulate (figure 6.7).  Although the 
system does contain a T junction with such a stagnation point, this is beyond the region that was 
pressurised (i.e. the wrong side of the cylinder valve) and does not show any evidence of heat damage 
or soot. Thus cavity resonance can also be dismissed as a likely possible cause of ignition.  
The possibility of particle Impact was assessed using Figure 10, shown in Table 2: 
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Table 2  Analysis of the presence of factors contributing to particle Impact ignition  
High pressure/ 
enriched 
oxygen? 
The system pressure exposure has been identified by investigators as 20.7 MPa 
pure oxygen which is well in excess of the 23.5% and 3 MPa requirements for the 
system to be regarded as high pressure enriched oxygen. 
High fluid 
velocity? 
The output stop valve has been identified as being fast opening (hence the 
immediate exposure to the gas pressurised to 20.7 MPa).  Assuming the pressure 
in the hose was 0.101 MPa the possible gas velocity can be estimated, using 
equation 5.53 from ASTM G88-13 (2013), as being over 1300 m/s (assuming 
isentropic flow). Although this is speed is well above the maximum speed of Mach 
0.7, the criteria for applicability of this equation (Perry and Chilton 1973), it is a 
good indication that the flow speed would be very fast, and well above the 45m/s 
required for particle impact ignition.  Both of these points show that fast fluid 
flow was possible. 
Evidence of 
particle 
contamination? 
Some hydrocarbon contamination on the outside of the hose was identified by 
investigators but there was no organic contamination inside the pipe.  Only a very 
small amount of inorganic dirt was identified using swabs in the output valve.   
The presence of a check valve and sintered filter to prevent contamination by 
larger particles from recharging cylinders suggests that this type of 
contamination, though not impossible, would be unlikely. 
Possible 
impingement 
sites 
The hose used for recharging was flexible meaning it is possible for the hose to 
have presented a face to the onward flow for a particle impact situation to be 
possible.  Also the check valve ball bearing was directly in the main gas stream 
with the sintered filter immediately behind it.  All three of these items showed a 
significant level of damage.    
Assessment of 
ignition mode 
Although it is not possible to completely rule it out the lack of serious particulate 
contamination identified in the system makes particle impact unlikely 
 
The possibility of Adiabatic heating/ pressure shock was assessed using Figure 9, and is shown in Table 
3:   
Table 3.  Analysis of the presence of factors contributing to adiabatic/ pressure shock ignition  
High pressure/ 
enriched 
Again, a system pressure of 20.7 MPa pure oxygen has been identified by 
investigators, which is well in excess of the 23.5% and 3 MPa requirements for 
the system to be regarded as high pressure enriched oxygen. 
Dead end 
tubing with/ 
near damage 
The ‘output stop valve’ had been opened while the recharge cylinder valve at the 
end of the supply hose had not been opened making the tube dead-ended. 
High fluid 
velocity 
As mentioned previously the fast opening valve (hence the immediate exposure 
to a pressure of 20.7 MPa) and possible rapid pressure rise from 0.101 MPa to 
20.7 MPa.  The possible gas velocity can be estimated, using equation 5.53 ASTM 
G88-13 (2013), as being well over the 30-45 m/s threshold for possible particle 
impact ignition.  Fast fluid flow was, therefore, possible.  
Evidence of 
contamination 
Hydrocarbon contamination on the outside of the hose was identified by 
investigators but did not identify any particulate beyond that produced by the fire 
in the incident.  The presence of a check valve and sintered filter to prevent 
contamination from recharging cylinders suggests that this type of 
contamination, though not impossible, would be unlikely. 
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Possible 
impingement 
sites 
Dead end of closed valve, and multiple components in gas stream. 
Non-metals/ 
sintered metals/ 
Light metals at 
dead end point 
In the area of ignition the only polymeric material is the PTFE liner of the filling 
hose.  Using equation 4.14 (Benson 2015) the SIT of PTFE can be estimated to be 
approximately 763 K.  Again assuming atmospheric pressure in the system before 
pressurisation, and using information in Newton and Steinberg (2009), the 
temperature of an ideal gas can be estimated as being between 1339 K (due to 
isentropic compression) and 11568 K (due to shock factors).  Although these 
temperatures would be momentary they are well above the SIT of the PTFE 
component.  There is a bronze filter directly in the gas stream.  Although bronze 
generally has good oxygen service properties (e.g. Melting point of 1127 and 
extinguishing pressure of 68.9 MPa for tin bronze) the high surface area to mass 
ratio may lessen the resistance to ignition and can be a site of build-up of 
contaminant material.  The bleed valve body has been identified as being made 
from Aluminium bronze.  Any components made of aluminium or similar light 
metals are more susceptible to ignition than heavier iron or copper based 
materials. 
 
Based on the evidence available, and these analyses, all of the requirements for an adiabatic 
compression/ shockwave ignition were present making this the most likely source of ignition. 
5. Conclusions 
The flow diagram road map approach has been developed & demonstrated to identify probable or 
possible ignition sources in oxygen systems, even in environments where time and access to evidence 
may be limited.  These diagrams benefit industry allowing easy interpretation of complex 
environments with a range of paths for relative in-experts.  This allows collection of data, imperative 
for any post-event analysis, in a timely and reliable manner.  The data can then be used academically 
for meta-studies on hazard likelihood, and to identify new hazards.  The roadmaps can also benefit 
designers of oxygen systems allowing them to test designs and operating procedures against specific 
ignition scenarios. 
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